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Vietnam is a development success story. It has undergone a shift from an inward-looking 
centrally planned economy to a market oriented economy 
over the past twenty years. Enabled by this shift, Vietnam 
has steadily improved its GNI per capita and is now 
considered a lower-middle income country by the World 
Bank. In 2002, the average annual income was 430 USD; 
by 2007, the number had grown to 1,260 USD.
i
 It is also 
one of the most active emerging markets in the region. In 
2011, the GDP reached 124 billion USD. Vietnam is 
located on the eastern coast of the Southeast Asian 
peninsula. It borders the South China Sea. Internally, the 
nation is comprised of 63 provinces, 54 nationally 
recognized ethnic groups, and numerous languages. 
Vietnam is home for 87.8 million people. Consistent 
economic growth over the past twenty years has 
tremendously raised the living standard in Vietnam: 
during the 1990’s Vietnam’s economy grew by 7 to 9 percent annually. Excluding the global 
recession, which reduced growth to 5 percent annually, Vietnam continued this trend throughout the 
2000s.  (See appendix A for general statistics on Vietnam). For Vietnam, the work does not end 
Figure 1: CIA World Factbook 
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here, to become competitive in the global economy requires further reduction of trade barriers, a 
more effective rule of law, and less cumbersome provisional regulations.   
Foreign investment is widely considered to benefit developing economies. Along with 
bringing in new capital for investment, FDI has been shown to contribute to raising exports and 
integrate nations in networks of trade. Data taken from East Africa adds that foreign firms employ 
more people, they report a higher “value added” per worker contributing to the idea that FDI raises 
productivity in the host country, and finally foreign firms spend more to train their employees.
ii
  
FDI is attractive to nations which wish to raise gross national income per capita. However domestic 
investments, both private and public, also play a vital role. Foreign investment becomes all the more 
important if a nation lacks ample private savings to draw on or an operating surplus in the 
government budget. Foreign investment may be in portfolio markets, such as investments in 
government bonds, corporate bonds, or equity markets. However, emerging markets frequently have 
not yet developed robust capital markets leaving foreign dollars with one option: direct investment.  
This is indeed the case in Vietnam; the government has run an operating deficit since 2007.
iii
  
At four percent of GDP in 2011, the deficit in Vietnam requires investment from private households 
or international sources. The private domestic savings rate in Vietnam (household savings) has been 
estimated to be at 14 percent of income.
iv
  While this is higher, as we would expect, than many 
developed economies, it is much lower than the rates enjoyed by peer nations in the region and 
income class.
v
 The absence of significant domestic savings, and thereby access to funds for 
investment, lends one solution: increase foreign direct investment to sustain economic growth.  
Vietnam has been able to do just that, however there remain hindrances on foreign investment, 
which Vietnam must remove in order to sustain the economic development. 
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 This analysis is broken into three interdependent sections: First, an analysis of the 
restrictions placed on foreign direct investment in Vietnam captures the current freedoms and 
inhibitors of investment in Vietnam. Foreign direct investment is defined by the UN as an 
investment made to acquire a lasting interest in or effective control over an enterprise operating 
outside of the economy of the investor.
vi
 Second, a cursory look at the macroeconomic risks, to 
which investment dollars are susceptible, will paint a realistic portrait of return of foreign 
investment.  Finally, this paper will examine the current, and historical, trade relationship between 
Vietnam and the European Union, in order to convey that the opportunity for investment in Vietnam 
remains to be an opportunity for Europe’s developed economies. 
 
 
Part One: Foreign Investment Restrictions in Vietnam 
After the communist North reunited Vietnam by defeating the US backed South in 1975, 
Vietnam’s economy was stagnate for 10 years. The restructuring of the economy was slow due to 
difficulties in production, bureaucratic mismanagement, and impediments in the process of 
privatization.
vii
  In 1986 Nguyen Van Linh, a Communist Party Leader, introduced Doi Moi, or 
“Renovation”, which created a “socialist-oriented market economy,”viii one in which private 
enterprise, and decentralized governmental industries were encouraged. Dr. Dao Duy Quat ushered 
in this new Vietnam by stating: “Renovation does not mean giving up the goal of socialism which 
our Party and people have chosen; renovation has nothing to do with transformation, renovation is 
to find suitable steps, forms and measures for successful building up of socialism. It is a definite 
affirmation of our path to socialism, passing over the capitalist development.”ix  Ever since the 1986 
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Renovations, the Government of Vietnam (GVN) has attempted to position itself positively in the 
mind of foreign investors.
 x
 As a result, Vietnamese leaders are working closely with economists to 
usher in stability, predictability of financial markets, and controlled long-term economic growth.  
The idea of socialism has evolved over the past 30 years as the government tries to marry its 
ideals with the decentralization and liberalization of the economy.  While many industries have 
been nationalized during this time, the GVN has shown a tremendous willingness to create an 
attractive environment for foreign direct investment. The following statues reflect the intention to 
open the Vietnamese economy to global markets; they will be referred to throughout this paper: 
Law on Investment 2005, Law on Land Use 2003, Law on Intellectual Property 2005, Decree 59, 
and finally the WTO provisions.
xi
 
In 2007, Vietnam joined the WTO.
xii
 Regulations included in this significant adoption 
increased transparency and leveled the playing field, in some industries, between domestic and 
foreign businesses operating in Vietnam. (See Appendix B for a breakdown of industry-specific 
investment regulations.) Since its inception into the WTO, Vietnam has dramatically increased its 
access to the United States economy importing both goods and services and has risen to the 
demands of a globally integrated economy by creating a competitive export sector.  Significant 
barriers to further Vietnamese integration are already being affected by WTO regulations: 
transparency of public companies, commitments to reduce trade barriers, and new laws to protect 
intellectual property have been passed. The courts are increasingly able to protect contracts and 
enforce breaches to those contracts. For instance, the GVN has reduced import tariffs to 15% or 
less, consistent with the WTO requirement.
xiii
 Vietnam will need to show continuous progress in 
these areas in order to become an attractive location for foreign investment.  A recent symbol of 
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progress is the 2011 statue which was passed to increase investor protection by requiring higher 
standards of accountability from public company directors.
xiv
  
Specifically becoming a part of the WTO prohibits the government of Vietnam from 
privileging domestic goods or services and from requiring state owned enterprises (SOE) to 
purchase domestic goods. The government cannot use percentage quotas to dictate exports or 
imports; thereby it must allow market conditions to influence its trade relations. Of course GVN has 
tools through which it can incentivize foreign investment.  Laws have been passed making foreign 
investors exempt from import duties on fixed capital which they plan to use in the country and they 
cannot purchase domestically.
xv
 Thus advanced fixed capital can flow freely into the country.  This 
includes all inputs for manufacturing and construction materials and raw materials for which 
Vietnam does not yet have an industry of its own.
xvi
  
Hurdles the GVN now faces is a lack of infrastructure, especially in the mountainous 
regions, home to ethnic minorities, and the nation’s poorest people. Further, much of the arbitration 
policy and jurisdictional issues have been left to the 63 provinces which have created cumbersome 
legal overlaps. This impediment alone has left Vietnam with one of the lowest rankings in the world 
for ease of starting a business. Corruption and lack of transparency persist throughout this country’s 
bureaucracy as it moves slowly through the process of privatizing thousands of SOE’s. 
Liberalization is not instant, import rights have been granted for all products except products which 
are reserved for state trading firms – the state reserves the right to ban or regulate products it deems 
to be culturally untenable. These products can include “cigars/cigarettes, crude oil, newspapers, 
periodicals, and recorded media.”xvii The GVN’s internal struggle between economic growth and the 
nation’s conservative identify is palpable. We will now discuss some of the specific areas through 
which Vietnam is opening its economy to the rest of the world. 
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In 2005, the Intellectual Property Law attempted to modernize Vietnam’s legal framework. 
The associated statues broadened the scope of intellectual property protected under the law.
xviii
 The 
US, in 2008, issued further concerns about Vietnam’s protection of intellectual property. One 
remaining difficulty lay in trademark infringement which is wide spread and difficult to enforce. 
Copyright infringement has however been receiving better protection from Vietnamese authorities. 
The US State department indicates: “most often, authorities use administrative actions such as 
warnings and fines to enforce IPR protection because they have limited resources for 
enforcement.”xix Although, enforcement has been strengthened considerably since 2008 when 
criminal penalties for infringement were circulated, Vietnam still has one of the highest rates of 
piracy in the world for software, music and movies.
 xx
  Civil cases for trademark and copyright 
infringement are becoming more common and substantial compensation is increasingly being 
awarded.  
The “people of Vietnam” have ownership rights to the land. Neither nationals nor foreigners 
can personally own land. Firms may lease land from the government, as the Land Use Act (2003) 
outlines, on a 50 year contract, 70 years in some of the poorer regions. The contract is renewable. 
Companies therefore must apply for a land use license. Licenses are awarded by the central 
government or by the provincial government depending on the investor, the size of the investment, 
and the sector of business.  This can be an extremely burdensome process because the GVN has 
decentralized authority to the provincial heads. Decentralization has led to “considerable regional 
differences” including distinct interpretations of investment laws.xxi 
The tax code can be equally as messy; provinces are allowed to tax their jurisdictions how 
they see fit. Vietnam does not, however, tax incomes remitted by foreign-investors to their home 
countries. Once investors have fulfilled their local tax requirements they are free to move capital out 
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of the country without penalty.  This picture is over simplified because it does not consider informal 
payments, which pervade Vietnam’s bureaucracy.  In 2011 Transparency International Corruption 
Perceptions Index ranked Vietnam 112 out of 182 countries. (See Appendix C; also note appendix 
D – The Heritage Foundation’s ranking of Economic Freedom). Lack of government transparency, 
accountability, and freedom of the press continue to be significant inhibitors. According to 
Vietnam’s 2010 Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI), which surveyed 1,155 foreign-invested 
firms about informal charges they made, 20% noted informal start-up fees, 40% paid fees to bid on 
contracts, and 70% attested to paying “grease” money for customs clearances.xxii  Below (see figure 
2) are three indexes comparing the strength of investment law in Vietnam with the region and with 
the globe: 
 
Figure 2 - Investing Across Borders: Arbitrating Commercial Disputes. The World Bank Group. 
 
From these estimates, one can see that Vietnam’s rule of law has gained traction against global 
averages. However, the GVN can still take significant steps to simplify the process of starting a 
business: licensing, taxing, and protecting intellectual property. A less optimistic opinion from the 
Heritage Foundation (figure 3) states that the judicial system lacks efficiency and independence. 
Further it points out that judicial resolution can take years.  
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Figure 3 – Doing Business.org – The World Bank 
 
 
 
The Heritage Foundation’s ranking reflects the convoluted state of the judicial system and 
weak protection of intellectual property. Starting a business takes more time the world average. And 
the licensing requirements are costly and arduous. While tariffs have fallen in compliance with the 
WTO, non-tariff barriers impede free trade.  Trends in investment freedom (figure 4) reveal that 
Vietnam is currently in a period of repressing freedoms, while trade freedoms (figure 5) have 
increased considerably relative to the rest of the world. In figures 4 and 5, Vietnam is represented in 
the red, compared to the black world average: 
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Figure 4 - Investment Freedom - The Heritage Foundation 
 
Figure 5 - Trade Freedom - The Heritage Foundation 
 
Some of the specific indicators which make up the Heritage Foundations ranking are found in the 
The World Bank’s Doing Business.xxiii  
Vietnam requires the regional average of six documents to export materials. The process 
takes twenty-two days to complete; again Vietnam matches its peer group. The cost of exporting 
was found to be almost half the regional average, $580 per container versus $906. Vietnam shows 
similar statistics on the import side.
xxiv
 This was not always the case. Significant trade delays 
existed before entry into the WTO. Vietnam drastically outperforms its regional peers in “ease of 
enforcing contracts”. While this seems contradictory to Heritage’s analysis we can see that the 
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region as a whole has an infamously weak judicial system. The “years” it can take to resolve 
judicial disputes, referred to in the Heritage Foundation’s analysis, is refuted by the World Bank 
which states that judicial review and contract enforcement take less than a year at 295 days. The 
regional average is 519 days. (In order to see how Vietnam ranks relative to its region please see: 
Appendix E, investor protection index, and Appendix F, ease of shareholder suits. We will now turn 
in greater detail to the sectors open to foreign investment.  
The GVN distinguishes between four categories of sectors; “prohibited, encouraged, 
conditional sectors applicable to both foreign and domestic investors, and conditional sectors 
applicable to foreign investors.”xxv18 of the 33 major sectors in Vietnam are open to foreign equity. 
Among the sectors open to foreign investment is banking and financial services.  The GVN 
currently allows 99% of its banking center to be wholly owned by foreign investors.
xxvi
 Vietnam 
holds restrictions on foreign ownership in services including telecommunications, electricity and 
transportation. The GVN allows up to 49%, in accordance with the WTO provision, of the 
telecommunications industry to be foreign owned.
xxvii
 This is also the case with air transportation. 
Because of the GVN’s strong paternalistic influence, no private investment may be made in media 
sectors, including television broadcasting and newspaper publishing. The government intends to 
keep the press under its watchful gaze. It is mandated that one-third of movies aired in Vietnam are 
produced domestically. (For a complete list of industry restrictions see Appendix B.)   
These restrictions apply to foreign, privately owned, multinational enterprises. These 
restrictions are not hindrances to attracting FDI. Other hindrances include “market size, 
infrastructure quality, political stability and growth potential.”xxviii The following indices (figure 6) 
reflect these persistent concerns: 
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Figure 6 - State.gov 2012 Investment Climate Statement
xxix
 
Index 2011 
Rank 
2010 
Rank 
Change in 
rank 
TI Corruption Perceptions Index 112 116 +4 
Heritage Index of Economic Freedom: 139 144 +5 
Index 2012 
rank 
2011 
rank 
Change in 
rank 
World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business 98 90 -8 
Starting a Business 103 100 -3 
Dealing with Construction Permits 67 70 +3 
Registering Property 47 43 -4 
Getting Credit 24 21 -3 
Protecting Investors 166 172 +6 
Paying Taxes 151 129 -22 
Trading Across Borders 68 65 -3 
Enforcing Contracts 30 31 +1 
Closing a Business 142 130 -12 
The above rankings illustrate a complex country which is often trying to synthesize a prosperous 
future with a paternalistic past. The GVN is working to open industries to market forces but at a 
pace deemed appropriate to those whom they govern. Moreover, the financial sector bears similar 
markings of hesitant privatization. 
Vietnam is in the early stages of reforming its financial system which remains unstable and 
weak for many reasons. GVN’s slow and inadequate adoption of international accounting standards 
plays a major role in keeping potential investors cautious. The banking sector is underdeveloped: 
highly concentrated at the top with four state-owned or majority state owned banks, and a 
“fragmented” scramble of small lending institutions at the bottom.xxx A combination of state 
directed lending, and low rates of accessibility to banking services, 25% of Vietnamese nationals 
currently have a bank account,
xxxi
 leaves the banking sector with low liquidity. GVN is going 
through the process of privatization of its banking sector which will most likely increase the 
stability of the sector, though it will take time.  State ownership in former SOE’s has reduced 
dramatically over the past decade; yet it is persistent in the banking sector.
xxxii
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To conclude, Vietnam’s leaders desire to take the country in a direction of global trade. 
They understand the close relationship between global competitiveness and increasing the living 
standards for their people. Internal legal reforms in addition to meeting WTO standards have 
brought about Vietnam’s increased GNI per capita. The WTO provisions in particular have 
increased transparency of public companies, required commitment to reduce trade barriers, and set 
new precedent to protect and enforce intellectual property rights. While bureaucratic corruption 
remains to be a significant issue, and a financial burden on foreign investment dollars, evidence 
suggests that reforms are having a positive effect. Licensing processes are becoming more 
“western” allotting firms the same rights to use the land as firms in the west which actually own the 
land. Finally a majority of industrial sectors in Vietnam are open to foreign equity with pressure 
mounting on lingering restrictions. The environment in Vietnam is changing, somewhat resentfully, 
as the government marries a socialist rhetoric with a market oriented structure.  
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Part Two: Economic Risk in Vietnam 
Much of what has been noted as a threat to 
potential investment in Vietnam also poses an economic 
threat to the nation.  The struggle between decaying 
ideals of a centralized economy and liberal ideals of a 
mixed market economy create a contradictory, almost 
stagnate, system of economic policies.  This is symbolized by the Heritage Foundation’s ranking of 
Vietnam’s economic freedom (figure 7): 51.3, right in the center. (See appendix D for Vietnam’s 
2012 Economic Freedom score). A central government too willing to interfere with market forces, a 
corrupt bureaucracy, and a weak judicial system inhibit economic growth.
xxxiii
   
Other economic 
risks include a volatile 
inflation rate, which rose 
rapidly during the financial 
crisis of 2008 when it 
reached rates in excess of 
25%.
xxxiv
 Subsequently, in 
2009, inflation fell to 7% 
only to rise to double digits 
in 2011 (see figure 8). 
Such volatility makes it very hard to sustain growth and predict returns in the future. GDP Growth 
simply cannot keep pace with the speed at which inflation rises and falls in Vietnam. The issue in 
Vietnam has been caused by both cost-push inflation and demand-pull inflation.  Cost-push 
Figure 8 – Real GDP v CPI Inflation in Vietnam 
Figure 7 – The Heritage Foundation 
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inflation occurs when the cost of goods has increased and there is no suitable substitute. Vietnam’s 
burgeoning economy often finds that it needs expensive fixed capital from abroad because there is 
no domestic alternative. Demand-pull inflation is occurring because demand in Vietnam is 
outpacing domestic supply. (See figure 9 for the inflation of the Dong against the dollar)  
The GVN is working to stabilize the inflation rate by tightening monetary and fiscal policy. 
Meaning, the GVN aims to drastically reduce its direct-lending and thereby reduce the supply of 
money. The current 
growth model: one 
based on an influx of 
capital and labor 
intensive production is 
being replaced by a 
model which depends 
on more effective 
investment and 
continuing to remove 
restrictions and barriers to international trade. David Dapice, an economist with the Vietnam 
Program at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, noted: “[GVN’s] 
macroeconomic management is not coordinated or is trying to do too much, while many 
investments are made with more of political considerations than with a concern for efficiency.”xxxv 
The primary purpose of Government Resolution 11 (2011) is to stabilize inflation of the Vietnamese 
dong.
xxxvi
 While GDP growth has been promising 7% in 2010, 6% in 2011,
 xxxvii
 the value of this 
growth has been largely undermined by the volatile inflation rate. The GVN needs to better manage 
Figure 7 - UNCTADstat, Exchange rates, annual, 1980-2010 
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inflation in order to bring about the stability and predictability that investors depend on.  Looking 
into the near future, the April 2012 World Economic ooutput, produced by the IMF, forcasts an 
inflation rate of about 12% in 2012 which, the report suggests, will drop off to below 8% in 
2013.
xxxviii
 The report indicates that rate will stay high because of strong demand. 
The investment needed to sustain economic development is not materializing, largely due to 
the global financial crisis. Also of concern is the decline in domestic private investment (non-state). 
The arduous shift from state domestic investment to private and foreign investment is shown in 
figure 10 below. 
Figure 8 – Investment Public vs. Private -  Taking Stock - The World Bankxxxix 
 
The left panel shows the weaning process off state funds and the irregular development of domestic 
investments as well as the foreign dollars coming into the country. As a result of the global financial 
hiccup in 2008, non-state funds sharply declined and required public investment to close the gap. 
The chart shows that the GVN has not begun to decrease its presence in the market to 2008 levels. 
The decline in private domestic investment dollars it not a positive sign for a country with 
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aspirations to become a middle income economy. While foreign investment has begun to rebound it 
still remains beneath 2008 levels. Further, Vietnam is experiencing a more significant decline in 
FDI from developed economies than expected. $4.7 billion in FDI was committed by the US in the 
first five months of 2011 compared to $9 billion over the same period in 2010.
xl
 Given the slow 
disbursement rate (figure 10, right panel) this will have a delayed effect on the economy. The 
overall decrease in commitment reflects the extent to which the global recession has affected FDI. 
That being said, external capital flows have been sustained largely due to recovery and expansion of 
portfolio investment in Vietnam.
xli
  
 The shift in investment capital from state spending to private and foreign spending reiterates 
the pressure on the GVN to promote FDI. As shown in the figure 11 below, the European Union has 
historically led the world in capital investments in Vietnam. European firms are perhaps best suited 
to fill the investment gap when the GVN returns to 2008 spending levels. The GVN has every 
incentive to do so once they consider the rising living standards of their people.  
 
 
Figure 9 – Source Countries of FDI, 1988 – 2006 – UNCTAD.org 
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From a social development point of view, Vietnam has seen a gradual increase over time in 
human development. The Human Development Index (HDI) assesses for: length and quality of life, 
access to education and knowledge, and access to a “decent” standard of living, which is measured 
by the gross national income per capita.
xlii
 (See appendix G for latest HDI Index.) Vietnam’s 
ranking in 2011 is 0.593; it is ranked 128
th
 out of 187 countries.
xliii
 Over the past twenty years it has 
improved, on average, 1.5% per year. This gradual increase can be attributed to a modest increase in 
mean years of schooling. The increase is also a result of the significant increase in GNI per capita 
228% over the twenty year period and the 19.5 years of added life expectancy.  
Figure 10 - International Human Development Indicators (2011) 
 
The improvements made to the living standard in Vietnam will continue to attract more investment.  
The economy’s domestic consumption will increase as well as its productivity per labor hand.      
19 
 
Part Three: Trade with the EU 
International trade in Vietnam has fully recovered and surpassed its pre crisis levels. The 
trade to GDP ratio is currently 160 percent.
xliv
 Figure 13 below shows growth in exports to all ten of 
Vietnam’s top trading partners.  The fear that Vietnam’s economy would suffer severe shock from 
financial crisis has passed. 2009 marked the worst year on record, though Vietnam’s exporters made 
significant progress in 2010 by increasing non-oil exports by 36.9 percent.
xlv
 Apart from increasing 
global food prices, which has significantly increased Vietnam’s exports, foreign investment as well 
as trade agreements have made the export sector resilient to shocks. Foreign owned manufacturing 
firms reported remarkable growth in 2010.  The garment industry grew by 24 percent; the footwear 
industry grew by 26 percent; the electronics industry boasted 30 percent growth in 2010.
xlvi
 
Figure 13 - Top 10 Export Partners in 2011 – USD (million) – The World Data Bank 
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Figure 14 – Top 10 Import Partners in 2011 – USD (millions) – World Data Bank 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Higher prices have also meant a higher national import bill.  Vietnam imported $2.2 billion 
more in the first four months of 2011 than in 2010.
xlvii
  East Asian countries remain by far the most 
important sources of imports. More significant trading partners, partners with whom Vietnam 
depends on to source its growing demand include China, South Korea and Japan. However, the EU 
represents the 2
nd
 largest importer of Vietnamese goods, after the US. (See charts 13 and 14 for 
majors trading partners as well as Appendix H to view the make-up of Vietnamese imports to the 
EU as well as EU exports to Vietnam). Agricultural products and various manufacturing industries, 
from office equipment to clothing, comprise the bulk of goods which Vietnam currently exports to 
the EU. In return the EU sells transport equipment and other machinery back to Vietnam. 
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The balance of trade between 
Vietnam and the European Union is 
favorable to the Vietnamese. Vietnam 
has significantly increased its exports to 
the EU of the past five years. Since 
2007 Vietnam has earned, on average, 
5.2 million Euro per year. In 2011, the 
balance was 7.5 million euro, 
representing 16.7% of Vietnam’s total 
export sector.
 xlviii
 This implies that the 
effects of the global recession have worn 
off. However, this is still less than one 
percent of total imports into the EU 
signifying that there is room for further 
growth into the European market.
xlix
 
European firms have the most to gain 
from growth. Figure 15 and 16 represent 
the import and exports to the EU over the last 15 years. The data shows a relationship of increasing 
importance between the EU and Vietnam.  
European banks already have a significant presence in Vietnam: the highest among its peers 
after Malaysia (see figure 17 on following page). Vietnam’s exposure to European banks was 10% 
of its GDP. Although the presence of European banks in Vietnam has decreased compared to the 
previous quarter,
l
 an influx of European investments would certainly pave the way for the European 
Figure 15 – Imports from the EU 1995-2010 – The World Data Bank 
 
Figure 16– Exports to the EU 1995-2010 – The World Data Bank 
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banking sector to 
increase their interest in 
Vietnams financial 
sector. 
li
 Further, 
European firms will find 
that they are able to 
solicit financing from 
their native institutions.  
 
 
Conclusion: 
Vietnam sits precariously waiting for the future. In the wake of the global financial crisis, 
foreign FDI has rescinded. While the GVN rushed in to avoid a more severe crisis and a resulting 
economic downture, they are committed to increasing the private domestic and foreign direct 
investment in their country. Despite a long global recession the export sector has recovered fully 
and the GVN is working to continue to privatize state run industries. Vietnam has weathered the 
financial crisis well, though foreign investment dollars will be needed to fill the gap created by low 
private domestic investment. Further, investor confidence is likely to continue to rise with loosening 
barriers and increasing living standards as indicated by the growth in HDI and GNI per capita. 
European firms have much to gain from further investment in Vietnam, the groundwork has been 
laid by previous investment and a strong bank presence, and the trade relationship is only becoming 
more important. The European Union would do well to capitalize on the opportunity to invest in 
Vietnam.  
Figure 17 – Consolidated Foreign Claims of European Banks on Asia1 
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Appendix A 
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Appendix A (continued) 
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Appendix A (continued) 
 
 
 
Source: World Data Bank – Vietnam at a Glance - devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/vnm_aag.pdf 
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Appendix B 
Methodology of the foreign equity ownership indexes 
  
  
Maximum foreign 
ownership allowed by law 
or policy (%) 
Comparison: 
Indonesia 
Sector group Sector 
In 
greenfield 
FDI 
In  
mergers and 
acquisitions 
Foreign 
equity 
ownership 
indexes 
Mining, oil and gas 
Mining 100 100 
97.5 
Oil and gas 95 95 
Agriculture and 
forestry 
Agriculture 95 95 
72.0 
Forestry 49 49 
Light manufacturing 
Light manufacturing 100 100 
68.8 
Manufacturing of food products 100 100 
Pharmaceutical products 75 75 
Publishing 0 0 
Telecommunications 
Fixed-line infrastructure 49 49 
57.0 
Fixed-line telephony services 49 49 
Wireless/mobile infrastructure 65 65 
Wireless/mobile services 65 65 
Electricity 
Electric power generation – 
coal, hydro, biomass, solar, 
wind 
95 95 
95 
Electric power transmission 95 95 
Electric power distribution 95 95 
Banking Banking 99 99 99.0 
Insurance Insurance 80 80 80.0 
Transportation 
Railway freight, Domestic air, 
International air, Airport 
operation, Port operation 
49 49 49.0 
Media 
Television broadcasting 0 20 
5.0 
Newspaper 0 0 
Sector group 1: 
Construction, 
tourism, and retail 
Construction 55 55 
85.0 Tourism 100 100 
Retail distribution services 100 100 
Sector group 2: 
Health care and 
waste management 
Health care 65 65 
82.5 Waste management and 
recycling 
100 100 
Source: Investing Across Borders. The World Bank Group. Accessed August, 15 2012 
http://iab.worldbank.org/Methodology/Investing-across-sectors 
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Appendix C 
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 
 
 
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/ 
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Appendix D 
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Appendix E 
Protecting Investors – How economies in East Asia and the Pacific rank on the strength of investor 
protection index
 
Source: Doing Business in East Asia Pacific. (2012) The World Bank. 
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Appendix F 
Ease of shareholder suits index (0-10) 
 
Source: Doing Business in East Asia Pacific. (2012) The World Bank. 
  
31 
 
Appendix G – Human Development Index 
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Appendix H 
 
 
Source: EUROSTAT (Comext, Statistical regime 4); World excluding Intra-EU trade and European Union: 27 members. 
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/113463.htm 
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